Unelected Power: the Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State/ Paul Tucker.

Tucker  Paul M. W.,

Главная
→
EBSCO eBook (только для КФУ)
→
Полнотекстовая коллекция книг EBSCO eBook
→
Просмотр элемента

dc.contributor.author	Tucker Paul M. W.,
dc.date.accessioned	2024-01-29T21:40:43Z
dc.date.available	2024-01-29T21:40:43Z
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.identifier.citation	Tucker. Unelected Power: the Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State - 1 online resource (663 pages) - URL: https://libweb.kpfu.ru/ebsco/pdf/2087844.pdf
dc.identifier.isbn	0691196982
dc.identifier.isbn	9780691196985
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.kpfu.ru/xmlui/handle/net/179746
dc.description	Includes bibliographical references and index.
dc.description.abstract	"Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint"--
dc.description.tableofcontents	Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface to the Paperback -- Preface -- 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values -- PART I. Welfare: THE PROBLEM, AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION -- 2. The Evolution of the Administrative State -- 3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State -- 4. The Structure of the Administrative State -- 5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies -- 6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies -- 7. Applying the Principles for Delegation -- PART II. Values: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR INDEPENDENT AGENCIES -- 8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1) -- 9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2) -- 10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy -- 11. The Political- Values- and- Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation -- 12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism -- PART III. Incentives: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE REAL WORLD: INCENTIVES AND VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES -- 13. States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment -- 14. The Problem of Vague Objectives -- 15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability -- 16. The Limits of Design -- PART IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RECONSTRUCTION -- 17. Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy -- 18. The Shift in Ideas -- 19. Tempting the Gods -- 20. A Money-Credit Constitution -- 21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State -- 22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State -- 23. Central Banks and the Emergency State -- 24. Overmighty Citizens After All? -- Conclusion. Unelected Democrats -- APPENDIX -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX
dc.language	English
dc.language.iso	en
dc.subject.other	Banks and banking -- State supervision.
dc.subject.other	Banking law.
dc.subject.other	Financial institutions -- Government policy.
dc.subject.other	Monetary policy.
dc.subject.other	BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Government & Business.
dc.subject.other	Banking law.
dc.subject.other	Banks and banking -- State supervision.
dc.subject.other	Financial institutions -- Government policy.
dc.subject.other	Monetary policy.
dc.subject.other	Electronic books.
dc.title	Unelected Power: the Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State/ Paul Tucker.
dc.type	Book
dc.description.pages	1 online resource (663 pages)
dc.collection	Электронно-библиотечные системы
dc.source.id	EN05CEBSCO05C973