Do Old Habits Die Hard?: Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;, no. 19/161./ Eric Monnet.

Monnet  Eric

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dc.contributor.author	Monnet Eric
dc.date.accessioned	2024-01-26T21:32:25Z
dc.date.available	2024-01-26T21:32:25Z
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.identifier.citation	Monnet. Do Old Habits Die Hard?: Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;, no. 19/161. - Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2019 - 1 online resource (32 pages) - URL: https://libweb.kpfu.ru/ebsco/pdf/2232998.pdf
dc.identifier.isbn	1498326773
dc.identifier.isbn	9781498326773
dc.identifier.isbn	1513508873
dc.identifier.isbn	9781513508870
dc.identifier.issn	1018-5941
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.kpfu.ru/xmlui/handle/net/178252
dc.description.abstract	Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944-1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.
dc.description.tableofcontents	Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Gold and the Bretton Woods System; The Gold Puzzle; Potential Motives for Gold Holding; III. Gold and Currency Under Bretton Woods; The Determinants of Reserves Holdings; Control Variables; Data Sources and Sample; Money rather than Trade; IV. Memory and Gold; Past Exposure to the Gold Standard; Personal Experience vs. Institutional Memory; V. Extensions and Robustness; Alternative Dependent Variables; Reverse Causality and Sterilization; VI. Implications: New Perspectives on the Bretton Woods system; VII. Conclusion; Data appendix; References; Tables
dc.description.tableofcontents	1: Gold and Currency in Circulation2: Memory; 3: Personal Experience and Institutional Memory; 4: Determinants of Non-Gold Reserves and Share of Gold in Total Reserves; Figures; Figure 1: Gold and International Reserves, 1950-1971 (billions of US); Figure 2; Catching-up. The Evolution of cover ratios over time (1950-1970); Figure 3: Number of Years in the Gold Standard vs. Average Age of Central Banks'Governors; Figure 4: Currency-Gold Correlation (1950-1973)
dc.language	English
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund
dc.relation.ispartofseries	IMF Working Papers
dc.relation.ispartofseries	IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;. no. 19/161.
dc.subject.other	Gold -- United States.
dc.subject.other	Monetary policy -- United States.
dc.subject.other	Electronic books.
dc.title	Do Old Habits Die Hard?: Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;, no. 19/161./ Eric Monnet.
dc.type	Book
dc.contributor.org	IMF e-Library - York University.
dc.description.pages	1 online resource (32 pages)
dc.collection	Электронно-библиотечные системы
dc.source.id	EN05CEBSCO05C379