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dc.contributor.author | Konnov I.V. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-25T20:34:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-25T20:34:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0233-1934 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.kpfu.ru/xmlui/handle/net/161811 | |
dc.description.abstract | © 2020, © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. We consider an extension of a non-cooperative game problem where players have joint binding constraints. In this case, justification of a generalized equilibrium point needs a reasonable mechanism for attaining this state. We combine a penalty method and shares allocation of right-hand sides, which replaces the initial problem with a sequence of the usual Nash equilibrium problems together with an upper level variational inequality as a master problem. In order to obtain a completely decomposable problem at the lower level, we apply its additional equivalent transformation. Convergence of solutions of these auxiliary penalized problems to a solution of the initial game problem is established under weak coercivity conditions. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Optimization | |
dc.subject | decomposable penalty method | |
dc.subject | generalized equilibrium points | |
dc.subject | joint constraints | |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative games | |
dc.subject | variational inequality | |
dc.title | Decomposable penalty method for generalized game problems with joint constraints | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.collection | Публикации сотрудников КФУ | |
dc.relation.startpage | 1 | |
dc.source.id | SCOPUS02331934-2020-SID85087907624 |