Problems of deep disagreement

dc.contributor.author	Karimov A.
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-15T21:46:32Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-15T21:46:32Z
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.identifier.issn	1234-5792
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.kpfu.ru/xmlui/handle/net/155828
dc.description.abstract	© 2019, Polish Academy of Sciences - Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. All rights reserved. Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic principles, pertaining to the methods of justification and argumentation. Relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conceptual metaphor of “hinges,” researchers arrive at the conclusion that deep disagreement cannot be resolved. This conclusion leads to relativism in the theory of argumentation. The aim of the article is to show that in the situation of deep disagreement it is theoretically possible to ascertain which of the positions of the participants of the argument has a better epistemic status, and hence, is argumentatively virtuous.
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Dialogue and Universalism
dc.subject	Argumentation
dc.subject	Argumentative virtues
dc.subject	Hinge epistemology
dc.subject	Intellectual virtues
dc.subject	Ludwig Wittgenstein
dc.subject	Theory of argumentation
dc.title	Problems of deep disagreement
dc.type	Article
dc.relation.ispartofseries-issue	2
dc.relation.ispartofseries-volume	29
dc.collection	Публикации сотрудников КФУ
dc.relation.startpage	239
dc.source.id	SCOPUS12345792-2019-29-2-SID85074283828

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Публикации сотрудников КФУ Scopus [24551]
Коллекция содержит публикации сотрудников Казанского федерального (до 2010 года Казанского государственного) университета, проиндексированные в БД Scopus, начиная с 1970г.