Onto-epistemological foundations of the theory of reference of proper names

Abstract

This article covers the leading contemporary theories of reference of proper names. It is shown that both descriptive theories of Frege and Russell and causal historic theory of Kripke have problems with explaining reference. Kaplan's theory of indexicals is also examined. It is claimed that indexication is necessary for any reference of proper names. Without indexication proper names have no real value. Theories of proper names are investigated in the context of their metaphysical and epistemological foundations. The notions of ontological realism and ontological antirealism are exposed. It is shown that the controversy of realism and antirealism can be clarified and get additional support from relevant theories of reference. It is maintained that the onto-epistemological basis for the descriptive theory of reference is antirealism and for the causal historic theory is realism. But the real problem for both realism and antirealism is an explanation of reference of indexicals. There are arguments which support both realist and antirealist approach to indexicals.