Virtue epistemology and psychology of education

Abstract

The main difference between "traditional" epistemology and virtue epistemology is outlined. The relevance of virtue epistemology to philosophy of education is set out. The ramifications of two main branches of virtue epistemology - virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism - for education are analyzed. The significance of cognitive agency for knowledge is shown. The importance of first-order and second-order cognitive faculties is maintained. The role of testimonial knowledge for education and problems it poses for virtue epistemology is exposed. It is proposed that testimonial knowledge could be virtuous provided that it is attained in epistemically friendly environment. The status of intellectual autonomy as a cardinal intellectual virtue is defended. The goal of nurturing intellectual autonomy in education is explained. The problem of educating intellectual virtues is discussed. Contemporary virtue epistemology is compared with Russian tradition of "developmental education" of Elkonin and Davydov. The role of mutual cooperation between students for attaining intellectual virtues is stressed.