

Semantic and metasemantic notions of analyticity

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Abstract

© 2014, Canadian Center of Science and Education. All rights reserved. In this article the evolution of main conceptions of analyticity is analyzed. Kant's criteria for analytic/synthetic distinction are discussed. Frege and Carnap notions of analyticity are set out. It is shown that Frege and Carnap shifted the criteria of analyticity to the justificatory status of judgments. The notion of truth in virtue of meaning and its criticism is exposed. Critical arguments against analyticity by W. V. O. Quine are discussed. Williamson's arguments against traditional notions of analyticity are formulated. Williamson maintains that analytic truths are reduced to truths of other base classes-necessary, semantic or logical. It is shown that the stipulative definition of analyticity is vulnerable to Williamson's argument. Russell's conception of truth in virtue of reference determiner is exposed and evaluated. It is defended that the notion of truth in virtue of reference determiner is immune to many standard objections against analyticity.

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Keywords

Analyticity, Meaning, Reference, Stipulation