

И мужчины, и женщины не стесняясь, открывали срамные места.

И мужчины, и женщины здесь стреляют из лука с такой силой, что можно пронзить камень.

Стрелы сделаны из тростника, наконечники стрел – из костей рыб.

Наконечники их похожи на чистый алмаз, пронзают как остроконечное перо.

Они подходят и стреляют стрелы в корабли. Никто раньше не видел таких людей.

Среди них есть люди разных типов. Каждого из них Бог создал по-своему.

Некоторые из них имеют рога наподобие оленям, а некоторые имеют один глаз посередине.

У некоторых одна нога и похожи на птицу.

Милый друг, у некоторых отсутствует шея, а голова растет прямо на груди.

У некоторых лица подобны собаке и имеют такой же хвост.

Хотя они похожи на собак, однако людей не кусают.

Знай, что это – человек, однако он странный, его рот и нос подобны собачьим.

У некоторых лица плоские. Так рассказывали люди, приплывшие оттуда на кораблях.

За этим местом существует далекий остров, где живут люди со слоновыми ушами.

Слушай теперь о людях со слоновыми ушами, и ты будешь удивлен.

Милый друг, они завязывают и закрепляют уши на затылке.

Если отпустить, то они доходят до колен. Иногда они укрываются ушами.

Однако они люди, а не хищные звери. Работают как звери и не скрывают срамные места.

Все рассказанное происходило в Китайском море. Так говорили люди, побывавшие в тех краях» [1, с.141-145].

Известно, что Китай долгие века был закрытой страной и только в начале XVI века (в 1515 году) португальцы, прибыв к берегам южнокитайской провинции Гуандун вблизи Гуанчжоу (Кантон) стали осваивать прибрежные земли. Конечно же, изложение со слов португальский моряков в книге Пири Реиса традиций, быта, рода занятий людей, населявших Китай, кажется странным для современного человека, но карты Китайского моря с ее островами и берегами, составленные Пири Реисом, впоследствии сыграли неопределимую роль для развития мореплавания.

Возможно произведение Пири Реиса «Китаб-и Бахрийе», которое было переведено мною на русский язык, послужит дополнительным материалом для исследователей Китая с точки зрения восприятия ее путешествующими в XVI веке.

ЛИТЕРАТУРА

1. Piri Reis. Kitab-i Bahriyye, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 2002
2. Piri Reis. Kitab-i Bahriyye, Denizcilik kitabı, Baskıya hazırlayan Yavuz Senemoğlu, 1973
3. Л.С.Васильев. История религий Востока. Москва, «Высшая школа», 1983

УДК 327

Harutyunyan Aghavni Alexandri, Ph.D. in History, Leading Researcher
Department of International Relations at the Institute of Oriental Studies
National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Armenia.
Senior Lecturer at the Depart. of World Politics and International Relations
Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University
aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com

RUSSIA AND CHINA: ON THE CREATION OF «A COMMON EURASIAN ECONOMIC SPACE»

Abstract: This paper analyzes the intersection between Russian and Chinese connectivity projects, explores the reaction of both sides into one another's connectivity undertakings, assesses to what extent they complement or rival one another, and how this connectivity impacts on bilateral relations and their respective relations with other Eurasian states.

Key words and phases: Economic Belt of the Silk Road (EBSR), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Conjugation of EBSR and EEU.

Арутюнян Агавни Александровна, канд. ист. наук, ведущий науч. сотрудник
Отдела Международных отношений Института Востоковедения
Национальной Академии Наук Республики Армения,
Ст. преподаватель кафедры Всемирной Истории и зарубежного
регионоведения Российско-Армянского (Славянского) университета
aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com

РОССИЯ И КИТАЙ: О СОЗДАНИИ «ОБЩЕГО ЕВРАЗИЙСКОГО ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО ПРОСТРАНСТВА»

Аннотация. В статье рассматривается взаимосвязь между российским (ЕЭС) и китайским (ЭПШП) проектами взаимодействия, изучается реакция обеих сторон на обязательства по подключению друг друга, оценивается насколько эти проекты дополняют друг друга или конкурируют между собой, как это взаимодействие влияет на двусторонние отношения и соответственно на их отношения с другими евразийскими государствами.

Ключевые слова и фразы: Экономический пояс Шелкового пути (ЭПШП), Евразийский экономический союз (ЕЭС), Сопряжение ЭПШП и ЕЭС.

Conjugation and harmonization despite differences

The Economic Belt of Silk Road (EBSR) and Maritime Silk Road of 21 Century (MSR), also known as the One Belt, One Road initiative (OBOR)*, is a Chinese-led development framework presented by President of China Xi Jinping during his official visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013. OBOR aims to boost connectivity and infrastructural ties between China and more than 60 countries. It plans to develop transport communication network in order to create modernized economic and transport corridors, and combined will create a massive loop linking three continents - «economic cooperation area» stretches from the Western Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Baltic Sea.

The Chinese concept of building OBOR, attracted a lot of attention and widely discussed in political and expert circles of many countries. Some media outlets and public opinion leaders in Russia as well expressed discontent, asking China to clarify the details of the initiative (22, p. 61). They supposed the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) might not be willing or even able to cooperate with OBOR. Resistance from Russia is expected since it may leave the countries along the route, including current EAEU member states, torn between pursuing stronger ties with Russia or China (9, p. 12). There was also a view that China's EBSR is an attempt to drive Russia out of the region at a time when Moscow is trying to promote its own EAEU integration project (10). In Russia, the opinion is often expressed that Central Asia (CA) is 'secured' for Russia and that Silk Road (SR) zone should fall within Moscow's 'sphere of influence,' regardless of Chinese opinion (17, p. 12). So many experts consider that Russian EAEU and Chinese OBOR have very different approaches in CA and their implementation could

* The Economic Belt of Silk Road brings together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic), linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China's coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.

cause a significant and multifaceted political influence. Since these two projects intersect primarily in CA, it is widely believed that a clash between Moscow and Beijing is inevitable (14).

However, in spite of various pessimistic predictions of some analysts and experts from Russia and other countries, Russia expressed its readiness to «harmonize relations» and «prevent a clash of interests» with China through the idea of «conjugation» of EBSR and EEU (2). This happened particularly when Russia became alienated from the West after the Ukraine crisis (8).

President Vladimir Putin, in a February 2014 meeting with President Xi Jinping, explicitly stated that Russia is supportive of China's EBSR proposal. They reached a consensus on EBSR's construction and its connection with Russia's Trans-Eurasia Railway (16). Later President Putin stressed the importance of Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway and Baikal-Amur Mainline transit potential in the docking of the Chinese and Russian overall transport systems (26).

A joint statement, released on May 20, 2014 in Shanghai, heralded in «a new stage in the comprehensive strategic partnership» between Russia and China (34). It contains elements of a treaty for a military-political alliance, albeit without legal enforcement. Two countries signed more than 40 inter-governmental, inter-ministerial, and inter-regional documents. Since then Chinese vector in Russian foreign policy transformed from energy-centered (commodity-centered) to geopolitical (17, p. 6).

During the annual Boao Forum (March 2015), the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov expressed Moscow's readiness to join one of OBOR's financing vehicles, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with a total capital participation amounting to (6.66% ownership stake - US\$ 6,536.2) (3). On April 2015, Russia showed full support by joining the AIIB as a founding member (19) and also stressed its eligibility to several management positions in the bank. Russia now is among AIIB's top five leading countries entitled to a corresponding voting share and a hand in the bank's management (15).

Moreover, in the May 2015 Putin-Xi Summit in Moscow, the two leaders signed a joint declaration «on cooperation in coordinating development of EEU and EBSR» - reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies creation of a «common economic space» in Eurasia (7), that includes an EEU-China free trade agreement (FTA) (23).

The question of a FTA with China, which is a problem for both Russia and CA states, given their high protectionism, was declared a distant goal and effectively put off for the future. The Eurasian Economic Commission, the supranational body of the EAEU, was mandated by the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia to start negotiations on a trade and investment agreement with China. Thus, China has recognized the EAEU and expressed its readiness to deal with this organization and not just talk separately with member-states (10). Beijing stressed the need to «carefully consider the strategic interests of Russia» which shows China's willingness to strengthen cooperation with other Eurasian countries while taking into account the Russian position (26). It may mean also, that Moscow and Beijing should not view the docking of projects solely as a Russian-Chinese undertaking, but rather as part of a larger partnership between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), which includes not only Russia and EBSR participating states (33, p. 43). Actually, Moscow hopes that China's agreement to recognise the EEU and to consider the union as its main interlocutor on OBOR-related matters will be the first step towards gaining greater international legitimacy for the EEU; and will give Moscow access to and a say over China's hitherto bilateral relationships with the Central Asian EEU members (8).

It should be noted, that the strong «binding» relations of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to Russia could be perceived by Beijing as a more favorable scenario, than their possible tilt towards Washington, as the actively promoted American New Silk Road Initiative for CA and Trans-Pacific Partnership for the Asia-Pacific, in perspective, may prevent China from creating «an environment economically oriented to Beijing» (24, p. 11). The thing is that promoting cooperation with Russia and other former Soviet Union republics is important for Chinese «go outside» strategy in order to solve major regional and global challenges - strengthen

China's international influence and multiply economic power. Chinese leadership is interested in maintaining constructive relationships with former Soviet Union countries, especially in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework, to counter destabilizing political factors such as «three evils»- terrorism, separatism and extremism (28, p. 18-19). These countries played key role in maintaining Chinese border safety, strategic security and stability, and in providing regional and global balance of power (25). The EEU is significant for the EBSR as it represents a common market of over 170 million people. In 2012, China accounted for US\$ 114.6 billion in trade with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus; and Beijing became the largest trading partner with the Customs Union (1). The growing contradictions between the U.S. and China can also create a favorable background for the development of constructive relations between Beijing and Eurasian Union. If tension to increase in China-U.S. relations, risking supplies of energy resources from traditional sources, China can supplement imports from the countries of Eurasian Union (27, p. 193). China envisions the EBSR to EAEU economic growth as a bridge between the regional economies of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific, offering an economic stimulus to both regions (20).

In a July 2015 meeting at Ufa, Russia, Presidents Putin and Xi discussed a potential framework which could connect China's infrastructure network (roads, railways and pipelines) to EAEU, which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia (6). Following the results of two summit (December 2015, Moscow) - a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and an extraordinary session of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - a «road map» for EAEU-EBSR integration had been outlined for approval by member-states and then at the EAEU-China level. In parallel, the EAEU intends to broaden the dialogue with China within the SCO and strengthen the cooperation between the two organizations (2). Actually, the EEU, SCO and OBOR projects are developing in parallel to but independently of one another, to a certain degree even creating some competition in the transport, energy, trade and economic sectors. However, scenarios are currently being considered with respect to creating a cooperation structure in which the SCO would play a central (connecting) role as the 'Eurasian bridge' between the EBSR and the EEU (17, p. 11).

In early October, 2015, during his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Vladimir Putin stated, that contrary to the policy of exclusiveness, Russia proposes harmonizing original economic projects and cited plans to interconnect the EEU and China's initiative of the EBSR (5). Moreover, at the plenary session of the International Economic Forum on June 2016 at St. Petersburg, President Putin suggested the creation of a large Eurasian partnership that will include the countries of EAEC, India, Iran, Pakistan and CIS partners. The partnership would start with simplification and harmonization of regulation in the field of industry and investment cooperation, technical measures, health settlement, customs registration and intellectual property rights protection (21).

Managing incongruences through accommodation

The strength of Russian-Chinese relations will depend on how the leaders agree to connect the EBSR and EAEU, since the goals pursued by Russia and China on their projects are fundamentally different. For example, Moscow defines its project in terms of an exclusionary sphere of influence which would confirm Russia's status as a global great power. Russia is less interested in genuine economic integration than in the recognition of its privileged status in the post-Soviet era (14). Moscow believes that the future world order will consist of macro-blocs, and that in order to have leverage over world affairs, countries will need to be affiliated to one, or better still to dominate one. With the rise of China, it is clear that Russia also needs a strategy more focused on its Eurasian neighbours, lest they all be absorbed into a Chinese bloc (8). In contrast, Beijing is interested in continuing its economic growth abroad, and OBOR was framed in a non-exclusionary way – being open to all interested participating states from Eurasia and Africa (14).

EBSR integration with EAEU is somewhat more complex, and such integration in practice may be difficult, as the EAEU is an organization with an institutional and regulatory framework, whereas the EBSR is more of a «vision» covering a variety of concrete projects (18, p. 2). EAEU

built its platform on the agreements of the CIS, and has made a customs union its core concern. It is also focused on very detailed economic cooperation and integration between the strategic sectors of its member economies, such as full customs liberalization, common tariffs and abolishing quotas and other restrictions. In contrast to EAEU, OBOR is concerned with reaching flexible agreements through coordination. It emphasizes mutually beneficial and pragmatic coordination in energy, commodities and transportation, without calling for harmonization in state economic policy tools. OBOR aims to connect Europe and Asia, with an ultimate goal of establishing a free trade zone (12, p. 8).

OBOR, in fact, was not a new course, but rather a kind of ideological expression of decades-old Chinese economic policy with all its inherent features (32). Beijing focused on clearly defined economic initiatives without any particular endpoint. China can continue to implement it for decades to come, but it can also announce its success in a few years. Unlike Russia-led EAEU, President Xi announced the concept of OBOR only after he was convinced that much of the work on the ground has been completed (14) *.

Chinese experts think that Russia is China's most important partner on comprehensive strategic cooperation and some unexpected problems will gradually appear if Russia's strategic interests and public concerns are neglected (22, p. 61). They believe that Russia's EEU plans do not conflict with the interests of China. On the contrary, today's more open pluralistic Eurasia is able to accommodate a wide range of cooperation initiatives. Therefore the EBSR, Custom Union, EEC and other regional integration mechanisms can completely collaborate and cooperate (38). China suggests that EBSR and EEU projects function in parallel and be promoted in conjunction, and it wishes to establish partner-based relations. Beijing does not rule out the coexistence of common ground and contradiction, an idea that falls in line with the popular Chinese saying «different, but together» (17, p. 12).

According to Chinese experts, by promoting EAU integration, Moscow mainly aims to create a powerful force and to become independent player in the world's political and economic relations. Moscow pursues far-reaching goal - to strengthen its strategic influence in the western Atlantic Ocean and speed up the process of entering the economic system of the APR (30). On the background of the cooling relations between Moscow and the West, the Russian leadership, mobilizing country's material and spiritual forces, intends to raise and develop the Russia's eastern regions and deepen the cooperation with Far Eastern and Asian neighbors, particularly with China, India and the ASEAN countries (35, p. 28). Meanwhile Russia's growing tensions with Ukraine have mirrored China's strained relations with Southeast Asian countries. Since most of these countries turned to the U.S. for support, Chinese-Russian partnership could be forged on the basis of a common political antagonist (4).

However, many Western analysts expressed doubts about the possible co-existence of EAEU and EBSR on the Eurasian continent, forecasting that China's initiative was expected to undermine Russia's plans for regional integration. EBSR is said to further China's economic expansion abroad that would cast a shadow on Russia's plan for the EAEU and would also put into question the future of Moscow's «clumsy» Eurasian Union. Russia, which is busy promoting a more protectionist economic solution for the CA region in the form of the EAEU, would not share Beijing's enthusiasm for OBOR (7). Moscow is very aware that it cannot, and will not try to compete with China's growing economic influence with its neighbors, as Russia's leading multilateral economic foreign policy project embodied in the EAEU has recently suffered from a variety of challenges, including its economic downturn, trade spats between members and the loss of Ukraine (19). Moreover, Russian expert Aleksey Maslov thinks that the «conjugation» of EBSR and EAEC is an economically senseless thing, which in this case clearly worked in terms of ideology. Any economist will explain that there can be joint venture, but in the economy there

* As for Russia, from the very beginning, Moscow compared its ambitious integration project with the European Union (EU), with the exception that if a common EU market took four decades to create, for EEU, under Russian leadership, it was thought that the same can be sufficiently established in just four years.

is no concept of «conjugation». In fact, it meant: «Let's interfaced w^{ith} you and share profits» (31).

A special economic zone once again could create troubles for bilateral relations and EAEU's external tariffs may present an immediate barrier to increased trade with China. Besides, the Russian–Chinese border currently suffers from excessive bureaucracy that, in particular, prevents cross-border travel and trade (18, p. 2). Thus, the Chinese-Russian unbalanced trade relations will engender resentment between the two powers, as well as in the regional countries stuck between the two (9, p. 13). Therefore, to facilitate trade, China and Russia will have to address a number of bilateral trade issues. Chinese investment to EAEU via EBSR could help revitalize the Russian-led initiative. Chinese trade would certainly benefit from wider access to the single EAEU market at a single trade tariff while a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) and technology clusters would benefit both sides (19).

The conjugation of EBSR and EAEC has created the conditions for further development of transport interconnection between Russia and China. With the newly established AIIB, BRICS and the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) funds and institutional capacities of the EAU, they could expand cooperation not only in the field of energy supply, but also «in the sphere of high technologies in transport, industry, construction, communications and agriculture economy» (37). In fact Chinese banks have become an important source of loans for sanctions-stricken Russian businesses and Chinese companies have even provided Russian companies with technologies (6). However some Russian experts consider as unclear how Moscow plans to interact with other AIIB member because of strained relations with the West. Besides, Russia talks a lot about «turning to the East,» but there are no much specific bilateral projects (36).

Moscow believes that EAEU and EBSR projects «do not compete, but instead complement one another» and can serve as «an engine of the Russian economy» (13, p. 62). On at least a symbolic and political level, the two projects would more likely integrate, but given the much broader remit of EBSR, the EAEU project will be possibly subsumed as a small part of the wider Chinese project. Beijing will increase its share in Russia's infrastructure and finance sectors, mainly on China's terms (19). If previously Moscow refused to give China access to its raw materials, but now it welcomes Chinese investment, even in sectors previously considered «strategic» and hence off-limits to Beijing. However, so far China's cash has not been as abundant as Moscow had hoped, and China is making use of the difficulties faced by Moscow to get bargains. At the same time, China has taken over some projects that were initiated with European capital in mind, but which hit a wall because of sanctions (8). Kazakh expert think that Moscow thereby gives a channel of growth of Chinese influence in the region under the cover of cooperation. However, Russia, in its turn uses this channel in order to control Chinese influence growth in the region and to direct it to its desired course (29, c. 165).

Although EBSR is supposed to be win-win for all, some experts think that by reinforcing China's foreign policy objectives through the shared goals of these multilateral organizations, the hierarchy within BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa) and SCO shifts in favor of Chinese priorities, in part at the expense of Russia's. In order to benefit from OBOR more fully, Russia appears to be willing to accept some loss of status within these multilateral organizations, particularly in light of fewer economic options with the West (19). In fact, Russia's main goal to solely dominate the former Soviet Union space is in the past. And China has achieved its goal «without ever raising doubts» about Russia's dominant position and never going for confrontation with Moscow.

Undoubtedly, Moscow and Beijing will cooperate if they perceive the given projects as valuable to both of them. However, plans to harmonize EAEU with China's EBSR and the projects intended for their alignment are viewed as a large-scale and long-term strategic task that may reshape and transform the entire Eurasian region when implemented.

References

In English

1. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim. China and the Eurasian Economic Union: Prospects For Silk Road Economic Belt // Analysis Eurasia Review. Eurasia Review Journal & Think Tank. Oregon. Albany. 14.05.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // [HTTP://WWW.EURASIAREVIEW.COM/14052015-CHINA-AND-THE-EURASIAN-ECONOMIC-UNION-PROSPECTS-FOR-SILK-ROAD-ECONOMIC-BELT-ANALYSIS/](http://www.eurasiareview.com/14052015-china-and-the-eurasian-economic-union-prospects-for-silk-road-economic-belt-analysis/) (Дата обращения: 25.06.2015).
2. Askar Nursha. EEU and CSTO Summits in Moscow: Another Six Months for Consideration // Institute of World Economy and Politics. Almaty. 23.12.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://iwep.kz/en/kommentariy-eksperta/2015-12-25/eeu-and-csto-summits-in-moscow-another-six-months-for-consideration> (Дата обращения: 05.01.2016).
3. Boosting Bilateral Ties: Russia Vows to Join Chinese-led Development Bank // Sputnik. 28.03.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://sputniknews.com/world/20150328/1020130405.html> (Дата обращения: 12.04.2015).
4. Brian Yeung. Ukraine Pushes China and Russia Together // The Moscow Times. 11.08.2014. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ukraine-pushes-china-and-russia-together/504904.html> (Дата обращения: 13.08.2015).
5. Casey Michel. Putin's Eurasian Union Doomed to Irrelevance by China's Silk Road // World Politics Review. 05.10.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16858/putin-s-eurasian-union-doomed-to-irrelevance-by-china-s-silk-road> (Дата обращения: 09.10.2015).
6. Deena Zaidi. A Tale of Changing Equations: China and Russia // Economywatch.com. 21.08.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // http://www.economywatch.com/features/a-tale-of-changing-equations-china-and-russia0721.html?utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Trending+Content&utm_content=55ae43c304d3013840000001&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook (Дата обращения: 24.08.2015).
7. Eurasian Heartland: Silk Road and EEU to Solidify Sino-Russian Relations // Sputnik. 12.06.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://sputniknews.com/business/20150612/1023289572.html> (Дата обращения: 14.06.2015).
8. Eurasian Integration: Caught between Russia and China // The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). 07.06.2016. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // http://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_eurasian (Дата обращения: 08.06.2016).
9. François Godement. «One Belt, One Road»: China's Great Leap Outward // China Analysis. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). June 2015. – С. 1-18. URL: // http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf
10. Gabuev A. Eurasian Silk Road Union: Towards a Russia-China Consensus? // The Diplomat. 05.06.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/eurasian-silk-road-union-towards-a-russia-china-consensus/?utm_content=buffer4ea3a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer (Дата обращения: 07.06.2015).
11. John C. K. Dal. China, Belarus Deepen Ties // Eurasia Daily Monitor. Vol. 12. Issue: 164. The Jamestown Foundation. – New York, 14.09.2015. URL: // http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44368&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7#.VrCHjJp95kg
12. Li Lifan. The Challenges Facing Russian-Chinese Efforts to «Dock» the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and One Belt, One Road (OBOR) // Competition or Coordination? The Eurasian Economic Union and China's One Belt, One Road Initiative. Russian Analytical Digest. - No. 183. – 03.05.2016.- С. 5-9.
13. Maciej Bochra. The New Silk Road and the Baltic Sea Region. One Belt, One Road // Baltic Transport Journal. – 2015.- N 4. – С. 60-62. URL: // http://www.balticpress.com/hr007_hr360_summary/05_btj66_60-62.pdf

14. Marcin Kaczmarek. China and Russia: Two Approaches to Integration // The Diplomat. 30.03.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-and-russia-two-approaches-to-integration/?utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_content=551bc34f04d30127a3000001&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook (Дата обращения: 02.04.2015).
15. Moscow Entitled to Several Positions in China-Led AIB Management // Sputnik. 27.06.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://sputniknews.com/business/20150627/1023919534.html> (Дата обращения: 30.06.2015).
16. Ruan Zongze. What Kind of Neighborhood Will China Build? // China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). Beijing. 28.05.2014. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-05/28/content_6942279.htm (Дата обращения: 12.06.2014).
17. Russian-Chinese Dialogue: The 2015 Model: Report 18/2015 // [Luzyanin S.G. (head) et al.; Zhao H. (head) et al.]; [I.S. Ivanov (Editor-in-Chief)]; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). – М.: Spetskniga, 2015.- С. 1-33. URL: // <http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC-Russia-China-Report-En.pdf>
18. Sarah Lain. Raffaello Pantucci. The Economics of the Silk Road Economic Belt // Workshop Report. Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies. London. - November 2015.- С. 1-4. URL: // https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20151126_cr_economics_of_the_silk_road_economic_belt.pdf
19. Sarah Lain. Russia Faces Facts on China // The Moscow Times. 02.08.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-faces-facts-on-china/526612.html> (Дата обращения: 05.08.2015).
20. Svedentsov Vladimir. The Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt – Prospects for Cooperation // Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. - Moscow. – 27.08.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://en.riss.ru/analysis/18639/> (Дата обращения: 30.08.2015).
21. Vladimir Putin: Together with China We Plan to Create a Large Eurasian Partnership // Katehon. 17.06.2016. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://katehon.com/news/vladimir-putin-together-china-we-plan-create-large-eurasian-partnership> (Дата обращения: 20.06.2016).
22. Yao Yao. Promoting Neighborhood Public Diplomacy: Problems and Solutions // China International Studies. China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). Beijing. - Nov./Dec. 2014.- С. 56-73.
23. Zuenko I. Connecting the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: Current Problems and Challenges for Russia // China in Central Asia. **30.10.2015**. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <HTTP://CHINAINCENTRALASIA.COM/2015/10/30/CONNECTING-THE-EURASIAN-ECONOMIC-UNION-AND-THE-SILK-ROAD-ECONOMIC-BELT-CURRENT-PROBLEMS-AND-CHALLENGES-FOR-RUSSIA/> (Дата обращения: 12.11.2015).

In Russian

24. Азизов И. О политике на постсоветском пространстве // КИТАЙ на постсоветском пространстве. Российский Институт стратегических исследований (РИСИ). Москва.-2012.- С. 7-12.
25. Ван Шуцунь, Вань Чинсун. СНГ и современная политика Китая // Свободная мысль. Апрель 2013. - №3. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://svom.info/entry/245-sng-i-sovremennaya-politika-kitaya/> (Дата обращения: 13.01.2015).
26. Каратаева К. Информационные войны добрались до Шёлкового пути // Российский Институт стратегических исследований (РИСИ). Москва.- 11.02.2016. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // http://riss.ru/analytics/26559/?_utl_t=fb (Дата обращения: 13.04.2016).
27. Кизима С. Роль Китая в развитии Евразийского Союза, Евразийская интеграция: Экономика, Право, Политика // Межпарламентская экономического сообщества

Ассамблея Евразийского. Международный научно-аналитический журнал. 2012. - № 12. С. 193-198. URL: // http://www.evrazes.spb.ru/files/Issue_12.pdf

28. Кокарев К. Взаимовлияние внутренних и внешних факторов развития и приоритеты политики Китая на постсоветском пространстве // Китай на постсоветской пространстве. Российский Институт стратегических исследований (РИСИ). Москва.- 2012.- С. 12-20.

29. Лаумулин М. Центральная Азия в зарубежной политологии и мировой геополитике // Центральная Азия в XXI столетии. Том V. КИСИ при Президенте РК. Алматы.- 2009.- С. 7-403. URL: // <http://kisi.kz/uploads/1/files/YqIB0toE.pdf>

30. *Ли Син*. Китай с одобрением смотрит на планы России по созданию Евразийского союза // Центр военно-политических исследований МГИМО. Источник Газета Хуаньцю шибао. Китай. 05.07.13. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://eurasian-defence.ru/?q=node/23697> (Дата обращения: 13.12.2015).

31. Маслов А. Это будет новая глобализация по-китайски // Platform. 01.08.2016. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://pltf.ru/2016/08/01/%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0/> (Дата обращения: 15.09.2016).

32. Попов Д. Центральная Азия в китайской концепции экономического пояса Шёлкового пути и стратегические интересы России // Российский Институт стратегических исследований (РИСИ). Москва. – 29.04.2016. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://riss.ru/analitics/30016/> (Дата обращения: 16.08.2016).

33. Российско-китайский диалог: модель 2016: доклад No 25/2016 // [С.Г. Лузянин (рук.) др.; Х. Чжао (рук.) и др.]; [гл. ред. И.С. Иванов]; Российский совет по между на родным делам (РСМД), НП РСМД, М., 2016.- С. 4-58. <https://docviewer.yandex.ru/?uid=41325327&url=ya-mail%3A%2F%2F159314836818232558%2F1.2&name=Russia-China-Report25.pdf&c=57b449b759a1>; <https://www.slideshare.net/RussianCouncil/2016-62516299>

34. Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики о новом этапе отношений всеобъемлющего партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия // Администрация Президента России. - Шанхай. – 20.05.2014. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1642> (Дата обращения: 13.12.2015).

35. Титаренко М., Петровский В. Россия, Китай и новый мировой порядок // Международная жизнь. Март 2015. - С. 24-43. http://www.ifes-ras.ru/images/stories/2015/interaffairs_201503-p24-43.pdf

36. Тодоров В. Китай поможет. Россия и Китай обсудят объединение ЕАЭС и «Великого шелкового пути» // Газета.Ру. 30.03.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://m.gazeta.ru/business/2015/03/30/6618801.shtml> (Дата обращения: 15.05.2015).

37. Шувалов: Россия решила присоединиться к Азиатскому банку инфраструктурных инвестиций // ТАСС. 28.03.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1862477> (Дата обращения: 14.08.2015).

38. Экономический пояс Шелкового пути: новое направление дружбы и сотрудничества между Китаем и Россией // Центр стратегических оценок и прогнозов. 06.02.2015. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: // <http://www.csef.ru/index.php/ru/component/content/article?id=6617:ekonomicheskij-poyas-shelkovogo-puti-novoe-napravlenie-druzhy-i-sotrudnichestva-mezhdu-kitaem-i-rossiej> (Дата обращения: 11.03.2015).