

Science as a Mythologized Phenomenon

Gulnaz K. Gizatova, Olga G. Ivanova, Artur R. Karimov,
German N. Stepanenko, Natalya A. Tereshchenko and
Tatyana M. Shatunova

Abstract--- *It is commonly believed that the scientific discourse is free from mythological stratification and that this freedom is provided by the profound theoretical nature of strict rationality. However, the practice of socio-humanitarian research gives reason to believe that scientific discourse also has a narrative character. The main idea of this article is to identify the limits for the scientific theory possibilities and to discover ways to mythologize scientific discourse. This is important, since the abolition of purely rationalistic approaches leads to the appearance of "blind spot", which does not allow us to see and analyze new trends in real life. During the study the methods of classical and negative dialectics were used, as well as the principle of deconstruction, developed in the framework of postmodern discourse and beyond its borders. These approaches are combined in the logic of coincidenceology, which makes it possible to combine previously incompatible methodologies. As a result of the analysis, it was revealed that the scientific discourse can be subject to mythologization/ideologization, and claims for the ability to demythologize large narratives by "scientification" are illusory. Moreover, the scientific theory itself can be adequate to its subject only when it goes beyond its boundaries, capturing marginal areas of knowledge, including the metaphysical component.*

Keywords--- *Mythologization, Globalization, Demythologization, Methodology, Scientific Discourse.*

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the culture, history, and social studies have clear tendency associated with the ironic pathos of the Derrida's deconstruction [1], which can be called as the "de-" principle: demythologization, dehumanization, deideologization, deontologization, demystification, etc. [2]. If we treat these provisions as a specific research strategy, then we need to recognize the following: a) this strategy has its limits as a theory, b) this strategy is suitable for studying a certain type of historical, social, cultural reality, and transposing it into a new reality requires caution and understanding the limits [3].

Thus, the situation "de-" has its theoretical and historical limits and can be used as a cognitive tool only with these limitations in mind. In this article we will try to see how this process of demystification turns into a new form of mythologization and becomes an obstacle in the study of cultural, social and historical phenomena. Moreover, the absolutization of methodological approaches also leads to theoretical blindness, the emergence of the theoretical "blind spot" that does not allow us to see new trends in real life. As soon as the ontologization of the explicated fragment of reality has occurred, and this explication will be recognized as reality, as it is in its unconditionality, the

*Gulnaz K. Gizatova, Kazan Federal University.
Olga G. Ivanova, Kazan Federal University.
Artur R. Karimov, Kazan Federal University.
German N. Stepanenko, Kazan Federal University.
Natalya A. Tereshchenko, Kazan Federal University.
Tatyana M. Shatunova, Kazan Federal University.*

methodological distortions begin. So, forgetting that the coincidence of empirical and theoretical fact is a brief moment of history leads to serious theoretical problems.

This article is a kind of continuation of the work begun in modern socio-philosophical literature and devoted to the analysis of modern mythologies of various forms of culture and social phenomena. Most often, researchers turn to the analysis of the facts of the modern national consciousness and self-consciousness mythologization [4]. Considering the phenomena of modern mythologies (Today, researchers speak of the process of “remythologization” [4, p. 1368]), the authors came to the conclusion that it is necessary to analyze these processes, which go not only in the space of the national cultural codes formation, but also in the development of scientific discourse, which fully corresponds, for example, to the expansive understanding of the mythology of R. Barthes.

The origin of these processes is in the overcoming the epistemological paradigm that has prevailed in science over the past three centuries, which is expressed in a radical subject-centrist approach, common for both natural science and socio-humanitarian knowledge. This position contributed to the situation when a speculative type of thinking formed in the knowledge, which was characterized by ignoring the boundary between the object and the subject of study. In other words, the conceptualization of the object in the subject is taken by the researcher for the object itself. This led to the spread of the subjectivity fear, which led to an even greater separation of subject and object. It turns out that the “de-” problems themselves are associated with the fear of recognizing the subject-subjective characteristics of human activity as forms of objectivity, with the fear of recognizing the inevitability and necessity of including the subject (agent) and consciousness in the object itself.

So, if we take into account these theoretical boundaries (limitations), then we can assume that the situation “de-” has its theoretical and historical limits and can be used as a cognitive tool only with these limitations in mind, otherwise the opposite effect will be provoked. Let us try to look at the material of several theoretical examples, how this process of demystification turns into a new form of mythologization and becomes an obstacle in the study of cultural, social and historical phenomena.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

Assuming the unity of the subject and method as the basic principles of the study, the authors rely on the dialectical method in its development and use the principle of deconstruction. The dialectical method is most relevant to the tasks of analyzing phenomena in their historical development and interaction in the modern dynamic globalizing world. It is not only about the classical dialectic of Hegel and Marx, but also the non-classical dialectic of Adorno and the entire Frankfurt school, in which the dialectic as an analytical tool is directed at itself, criticizing itself and examining the limits of the dialectical removal possibility. The use of dialectics makes it possible to see the phenomenon of scientific theory in its ambivalence, turnover, to discover the boundaries of the theoretical reconstruction of the subject, the relevance of scientific discourse. In the modern theoretical situation, the analysis of theories can only be carried out by deconstructing certain theoretical discourses, and deconstruction should be understood, according to Derrida, as a strategy of the theoretical thinking mobility, keeping it in a tone of constant change in accordance with the cultural situation and ideological context [2, p. 4]. In the words of Derrida himself, this is a kind of motive, “with your own words, your favorite topics, your mobile strategy, etc.” [2, p. 4].

Deconstruction is intended as a step towards the transformation of theoretical research methods. Traditionally, dialectics and deconstruction were considered as methods incompatible within a single research approach. However, modern cognitive context allows us to combine their heuristic capabilities on the principle of complementarity.

The possibility of combining different approaches is now widely used in social and humanitarian knowledge. This opportunity has already been realized in theorizing strategies and is familiar to the scientific community as the principle of oscillation (Vattimo), parallax vision (Zizek). Both options allow us to move from one theoretical position to another. One of the versions for the complementarity principle implementation in social and humanitarian knowledge is the strategy of coincidenceology (J. Regev), which is the proposition of equal paradigms, mutually opposing each other.

The use of this complex of methods, mutually complementing each other, made it possible to detect the aspect of the studied phenomenon, hidden from the researcher who works only in one paradigm. The combination of methods, however, makes it possible to move along an object with a maximum coverage of the resulting surface effects, which enables us to “highlight” the space of the “blind spot”.

Since the subject of research is scientific discourse, but not the scientific theory, we inevitably encounter forms of sociocultural mediation of certain theoretical scientific propositions, which is manifested in a kind of “metaphysical intervention”. The ability to overcome the limitations of scientific discourse is manifested in the ability to appeal to discursive formations that are marginal in relation to science, for example, philosophy, and under the influence of the postmodern paradigm, primarily to aesthetics.

III. RESULTS

The application of the described methods allowed us to identify some of the reasons for the transformations (and even deformations) that occurred in the theoretical principles that underlie the research strategies of modern socio-humanitarian science.

The roots of these processes go to overcoming the epistemological paradigm that has prevailed in science over the past three centuries, which was expressed in a radical subject-centrist approach, common for both natural science and socio-humanitarian knowledge. Such a radical subject-centrist position contributed to the fact that not only in philosophy, but also in other sciences, a speculative type of thinking was gradually formed, which is characterized by ignoring the boundary between the object and the subject of knowledge. In other words, the conceptualization of the object in the subject is taken by the researcher for the object itself. As a result, this causes the spread of fear of subjectivity, which is common, first of all, for social and humanitarian knowledge, which leads to even greater separation of the subject and object. Confidence in the almost natural separation of subject and object in the process of cognition, so necessary for the development of science, M.K. Mamardashvili called it a global illusion of objectivism. Returning to the stated topic, we can say that the problems with “de-” are related with fear of recognizing the inevitability and necessity of including the subject (agent), consciousness in the object itself, including the fear of recognizing the subject-subjective characteristics of human activity as forms of objectivity. The fear of subjectivity appears to us as an inverted form of the expansion of the subject, a desire to conceal the subject supremacy in the cognitive process.

Of course, theoretically, non-classical natural science recognizes the fact that consciousness is involved in the cognitive situation, but in reality, in the practice of specific private researches (and especially social-humanitarian ones, though it may seem strange) this principle is usually ignored.

Here we come to an important issue of “outburst” of the theory into practical activity, because only activity (even manifested in inaction) becomes and can become a way of objectifying the subjective, since it is in historical activity that the subject faces the need to overcome the limitations of voluntaristic subjectivity. It is such a verification by activity that reveals that the right of pure consciousness to the knowledge and appropriation of pure truth, uncomplicated with subjectivity, turns into a fiction.

It would seem that Heidegger, while criticizing the subject’s metaphysics (for example, appealing to be a shepherd of the Being, not the master of the things existent, in the idea of *aletheia*), not only touches the side of the Being itself, but also the cognitive process. But he cannot (does not want to / ignores) recognize spontaneous and in a certain sense existential-ontological character of the activity itself. Activity, as a peculiar form of the agent flow, must either be self-limited, subject to the existence, or it will be distorted by subjectivity. Heidegger is embarrassed by the ability of a modern human to imprint its images on the world, the desire to realize itself. He sees only the other side of this striving - the predatory postavisation in relation to nature, which is manifested in production. “To humanity of metaphysics, yet intimate truth of Being is refused. The working animal is left to breathe the waste of its achievements, so that it tears itself apart and is destroyed into empty nothingness”, in “Overcoming metaphysics” [7, p. 72]. Acknowledging the fact of the human postavisation, which needs special understanding, Heidegger does not want to recognize the human right for work in the form of subjectivity, volition, and sometimes even self-will.

And that is why the ontological turn, which posed the task of deconstructing the epistemological paradigm in philosophy, in fact, did not solve it. This unsolved problem gave rise to the tendency for the formation of so-called regional ontologies by various disciplines, both social-humanitarian and natural-scientific. Sometimes this movement is defined as the tendency of humanizing knowledge and cognition, but in practice it finds itself as a new attempt to rigidly separate object and subject, avoiding the task of forming a scientific picture of the world which will be recognized by science (in question the positivist-minded theorists will suddenly play on the same field with Heidegger) and upholding a purely nominalist approach to cognitive procedures. For the philosophy itself, such an approach turns into consistent defilosophization.

As we have already noted, the subject of this study is not the historical socio-cultural phenomena, but some theoretical propositions.

Let us begin with the question: “Could the scientific discourse itself be subjected to mystification?” The question arises since we cannot explain how we can carry out demystification (demythologization, etc.) of the studied phenomena by means of a scientific theory. We build on the following provisions, which are very common today: science is not a large narrative, therefore, it lacks the features of narrative phenomena, which lead to their inevitable ideologization (mythologization) (a); the narrowing of the research subject (and the inevitably following aspiration to limit the area of theoretical generalizations) makes the results of the study more objective (b); the science

projectivity allows us to assume that, when the project is implemented, it also gets the final status of true one in this situation (c). And if it was not implemented exactly as it was intended, then it is definitely not true anymore.

IV. DISCUSSION

Before we answer the question, how we can carry out demystification (demythologization, etc.) of the studied phenomena by means of a scientific theory. Let us build on the following provisions, which are very common today: a) science is not a large narrative, therefore, it lacks the features of narrative phenomena, which lead to their inevitable ideologization (mythologization); b) the narrowing of the research subject (and the inevitably following aspiration to limit the area of theoretical generalizations) makes the results of the study more objective; c) the science projectivity allows us to assume that, when the project is implemented, it also gets the final status of true one in this situation.

Speaking about “narrative”, we naturally turn to the theory of “Grand narratives” by Jean-François Lyotard [8]. The general logic of the author is as follows. Cultural forms are traditionally developed according to the narrative principle. The narrative nature of discourses (religion, art, politics) implies the existence of a narrator (actor, subject) centering the story. The narrator structure is in the base of the narrative structure. The scientific picture in this regard looks special. The principle of science implies the idea of objectivity, which, according to Lyotard, is determined through the goal of science - meaning (denotation), in which the component of subjectivity is minimized. It is this objectivity/denotation that leads the researcher to the idea that science differs from all narrative structures by its neutral attitude to the world and to action. Thus, science relies on a single form that is not narrative and does not carry the distorting print of subjectivity. That is why it can and should play a leading role in the culture. This is the “version of science itself” adopted by Lyotard. We should say that Lyotard himself is not always unequivocal in his reasoning.

Considering that work has the title “A report on knowledge”, there is no doubt that knowledge is considered by Lyotard as the main product of scientific activity. However, we find: “Meanwhile, the term “knowledge” means not only the totality of denotative statements; the ideas about a variety of skills are also included, like: do, live, listen, etc.” [8, p. 52]. But if we are talking about the ability to live, then this is already a question of metaphysics, rather than of pure science. It is difficult to speak about life and death in science terms.

Consequently, the denotation of scientific discourse is limited by the need to enter other practices or games, as Lyotard calls them. But even the denotation itself turns out to be subjectively colored: “Scientific knowledge requires *the choice* (highlighted by the authors) of one of the language games - denotative, and the exclusion of others. The criterion for the acceptability of a statement is an assessment of its truth” [8, p. 66]. But it is known that the choice is the prerogative of the subject (agent). And further: “Scientific pragmatics focuses on denotative statements, it is here that it provides a place for the establishment of institutions of knowledge (institutes, centers, universities, etc.). But its postmodern development brings to the foreground the decisive “fact”: the discussion of even denotative statements requires compliance with the rules. However, the rules are not denotative, but prescriptive statements, which, in order to avoid confusion, it is better to call meta-narratives” [8, p. 154]. Thus, in the manifestation of science, the position of the subject (agent) is clearly visible. Moreover, a specific agent –

Cartesian one, which implies a clear separation of the agent from the object and the undoubtedly dominant position of the first in the cognitive process. This subject (agent) is very similar to the figure of the narrator, which is criticized in the theory of grand narratives. The rigid categorical subjectivity of the Cartesian persuasion turned out to be extremely passionate and imposed a certain style of subjectivity on all the rest of its forms.

In fact, science took on the role of a cultural filter, when one or another cultural form “passed through”, it received a certain mark of distinction. The consequences of this total rationalization will continue to affect the culture for a long time. It will pass almost a century, until science its-self discovers its narrative nature and faces its principles, which are in a certain situation productive, but, in fact, delusional.

It should be noted that the power and charm of science in the XVIII-XIX centuries are so great that all other cultural forms voluntarily rush into its arms. Art, as Heidegger says, is incorporated into the field of aesthetics, making the human senses the subject of anatomy. German classical philosophy is built as a scientific philosophy. The search for objectivity (crystallization of the subjective is also the reverse side of this process), recognition of the lawful forms of the existence manifestation and the search for these laws, unconditional desire to rationalize and legitimize a particular form through the recognition of its objectivity, these are characteristics of the philosophy at the end of the XVIII century - the first third of the XIX century. Science is simply declared a magician, able to legitimize any form of culture. Marx and Engels also fall under this illusion, who believe that a scientific ideology is possible that can rid itself of illusions and rid humanity of them. Probably, it would be more correct to say that it was not capitalism that tore away the covers of holiness and mystery from the world, but science and philosophy itself (and not only Marx’s philosophy, but any other’s too) tore off from the world the cover of subjective involvement, which was understood one-sidedly, like voluntarism, arbitrariness, delusion, forgetting about its reverse side - courage, responsibility, passion.

However, this position is certainly historic and in the XIX century it was productive. Here's how this historicism, with the example of K. Marx, commented by A. Badiou: “... for Marx, as for us, desacralization is not at all nihilistic, if only “nihilism” is intended to signify something that announces the impossibility of access to Being and to truth. On the contrary, desacralization is a necessary condition for such an access to be open to thought” [9]. So, the desacralization of the world is a historical side of the scientific approach. But if it is a historical side – it is limited.

We believe that science is still a great narrative, which suggests the possibility of distortion of reality in scientific interpretations. And the very idea of “de”(sacralization) can be called one of the cultural staple of this great narrative. It is no coincidence that postmodern philosophy gives rise to the intuitions of total mythologization and ideologization of any discursiveness (for example, in the works of Barthes, who considered "denotation as the last connotation" [10, pp. 8-9], or Zizek, who believed that: “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it [11, p. 30].

An interesting version of the mythologization of scientific discourse is offered by Guy Debord on the analysis of the philosophy of Marxism. The general thesis of one topic, far from the main plot of the “Society of the Spectacle”,

[12] is that theory turns into utopia (mystified, ideologized) precisely where and when it seeks to remain on the purely scientific basis of rationalism, to avoid the clouding effect of spontaneous practice invasions.

Debord shared Marx's theory and Marxism, which arose on the basis of its scientific propositions, the analysis of which leads him to the idea of the limitedness of the deterministic-scientific view. To clarify, it is not about determinism in science, but about the willfulness of scientifically organized rationality.

“The scientific-determinist aspect of Marx’s thought was precisely what made it vulnerable to “ideologization”, both during his own lifetime and even more so in the theoretical heritage he left to the workers movement” [12, p. 32]. And further: “In this way revolutionary practice, the only true agent of this negation, tends to be pushed out of theory’s field of vision” [12, p. 32]. Regarding the theoretical views of Marx, Debord has another opinion: “Marx’s theory is closely linked with scientific thought insofar as it seeks a rational understanding of the forces that really operate in society. But it ultimately goes beyond scientific thought, preserving it only by superseding it. It seeks to understand social struggles, not sociological laws” [12, p. 31].

Interesting, Debord actually follows the same path that Marx followed in criticizing the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach as a methodology of cognition.

Analyzing Hegel’s philosophy and Feuerbach’s criticism of it, Marx points to Hegel’s desire to remain solely on the basis of theory as an expression of consciousness and self-consciousness. But Feuerbach himself in, having understood the nature of Hegel's theologism, still does not overcome it, precisely because it rushes to the other extreme. Marx writes in “Theses on Feuerbach”: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object [Objekt] or of intuition [Anschauung]*, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively” [13]. And further: “The dispute over the reality or unreality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question” [Ibid.]. So, any absolute separation leads to the formation of empty abstraction - whether it is a theoretical abstraction, or a real abstraction. Attempt to obtain pure objectivity leads to the opposite: the function of the agent who brought himself beyond the scope of its research is perceived by the object itself, is included in its structure.

But what is the reason for such transformations? And why even Marx himself, discovered these patterns of thinking on the analysis of the previous philosophy, did not escape these pitfalls of theorizing?

Let us start with the definition of a spectacle by Debord: “The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images” [12, p. 10]. And further: “It is a worldview that has actually been materialized, a view of a world that has become objective” [12, p. 11]. But where is the science, which deals not with images, but with concepts expressing the essential characteristics of the studied phenomena? We'll see. Debord believes that the play has a monopoly on visibility, on the very possibility of seeing the world in its entirety and in details. At the same time, what is absurd to deny, science as a system of social relations also has some mediation by images, and since it is precisely a system of relations, it is not only the process of theorizing. It is influenced by cultural factors, general theoretical, historical situation, so that in understanding what is truth, reflecting the essence of things, science, as M. Foucault writes, suddenly discovers that the secret of the essence of

things is not some timeless mystery and absolute dry disclosure of truth. It lies in the fact that things have no essence, or that "their essence was built in particles from images alien to them. Let us underline, not from "alien particles or fragments", but from "alien images" [14, p. 600].

Lyotard says essentially the same thing, although on a completely different material, arguing about the forms of legitimation and scientific discourse.

The passion of refined objectivity and the gradual exclusion of the agent from the process of cognition - these are the "images" that stand between the world and the scientist and which lead to distortions of the scientific world view itself. We need to leave the high road, sideways, to the side of the road, to carry out the exclusion procedure.

The desire to overcome the narrative, inevitable for the form of activity, which is unconditionally connected with language, led to a futile, but stubborn search for pure objectivity. The search for refined objectivity led, in turn, to the fact that the object's element takes over the functions of the agent. Intuitively understanding this, the researcher begins to seek salvation from the subjectness of the object in its persistent fragmentation. However, no differentiation of scientific knowledge, no attempt to determine the individual as the true object of research and proclaim only the denotative goals of science cannot solve the problem of finding pure objectivity. And insisting on this just leads to various forms of mythologization, ideologization of scientific knowledge. Returning to the original theses of this article, let's say: the desacralization of the subject, carried out by science, turned into a sacralization of the scientific discourse itself, the formation of a kind of "blind spot" in the scientific discourse, distorting the vision of the world.

But let's try to radicalize all the problem points and shortcomings of scientific discourse as conscious, thereby adopting them as theoretical tools.

Let us begin with the goal of science, which, as we have already noted, Lyotard defined as denotative. Classical science, realizing this goal, called the process of knowledge a search for truth, and knowledge was an expression of the world and the knower unity and was defined as true if, from the point of view of cultural and historical experience, adequately reflected this reality. But now, having become a "real productive force", knowledge-truth began to serve the goals of progress and discover laws that can be used by the agent in his further practical and theoretical activities. This knowledge belonging to no one was the property of all mankind, and in this sense, it was an absolute value.

But here comes the era when scientific knowledge, which should have been an expression of the denotation of scientific discourse, begins to turn into property and immediately begins to lose its status of science and truth. Lyotard writes: "Knowledge is not science, especially in its modern form, although it cannot obscure the problem of the legitimacy of knowledge, forcing us to pose this problem in not only sociopolitical, but also in epistemological fullness" [15, p. 51]. Moreover, the sociopolitical and epistemological aspects begin to lead the situation in science: "... "the people", which is a nation or even humanity, are not satisfied, especially its political institutions, with knowledge: it sets laws, in other words, formulates prescriptions, meaning norms. The people, therefore, exercise their competence not only in the sphere of denotative, truth-revealing statements, but also prescriptive, claiming to

be fair. This is the essence of narrative knowledge, to keep together the competencies, not to mentioning the rest” [15, p. 51]. The thesis is clearly opposite to the original statement that science is not a great narrative.

So, the desire to overcome the narrativity, which is inevitable for the form of activity, which is unconditionally connected with language (conceptuality, the need to fix the results of theoretical activity and its procedural nature, etc.), led to a futile but persistent search for pure objectivity. The search for refined objectivity led, in turn, to the fact that the subject's element takes over the functions of the agent. Intuitively understanding this, the researcher begins to seek salvation from the subjectness of the object in its persistent fragmentation. But the object continues to be agent, like torn Orpheus continues to sing with every cell of his torn body. Therefore, no differentiation of scientific knowledge, no attempt to proclaim the individual as the true object of study, no nominalist methodological hobbies and an attempt to proclaim only the denotative goals of science can solve the problem of finding pure objectivity. Moreover, insisting on this just leads to various forms of mythologization, the ideologization of scientific knowledge, which today is fashionable to call by the scary word of simulacrum. Returning to our original theses, let us say: the desacralization of the subject, carried out by science, has turned into a sacralization of the scientific discourse itself, the formation of scientific blindness as an activity of "blind spot" that distorts the vision of the world.

Knowledge "dropped" from the hands of science. Lyotard cautiously speaks of the “legitimacy of knowledge”, but not of its truth, its applicability, which is undoubtedly related to the sociopolitical conditions of its existence, also depending on epistemic possibilities and limitations, which in turn are generated by cultural, historical and sociopolitical conditions. In these circumstances, the question of the desacralization of the studied phenomena begins to sound differently. A strictly abstract desacralization procedure leads to the opposite result. The scientific discourse itself is mythologized, so it cannot be a solution for demythologizing the object.

In general, if we talk not about the content, but about the form, desacralization (and any form of “de-”) is overcoming the illusion of the whole as part and part as whole (not to be confused with the problem of the hermeneutic circle - comprehending the whole through part, but part through whole!) But is it possible, if today, both epistemically, culturally, logically, socially and politically, we inevitably fall into an inversion, and a new vision becomes the same vision of a part as a whole? Is it possible to overcome this reverse mythologization of the scientific discourse? It seems possible to a certain extent.

Let us return to Debord. At its core, Marx's theory is above scientific thought. Scientific thought is preserved only after it has been overcome. What is in the "part" that is above scientific thought? It is just the transition, the exit to another form of activity, into practice, into practical theory. It should be noted that in this case the practice is socio-historical. With regard to scientific discourse, this “part”, at first glance, seems to be a side road, a peculiar residue in relation to the integrity of the main path of science. However, we have already talked about the significance of the bypass trails. This metaphysical remainder is what makes science more than itself, and it is in this “more” that it reaches its own integrity, fullness and social, human significance. Kazan philosopher E.A. Bobrov wrote in 1894: “Any science can consider itself fundamental, and its very existence is legitimate and secure, if it can prove its noble origin from metaphysics, as a common doctrine of Being. This requirement is of particular

importance in the sciences of the spirit, in other words, the so-called philosophical disciplines: psychology, aesthetics, ethics, logic, social science, etc.” [16, pp. 88-89]. Let us remove the "noble origin", we will not play semantics. So, what is Bobrov talking about? He is talking about the ability of science to give a holistic picture of the world, to overcome the fragmentation, one-sidedness, that "access to Being," carried out by cognition, is a side of Being itself. But not all Being. And therefore, we must dare to go out of the science borders. Without physics, metaphysics is impossible and vice versa. The world is linked from above.

This metaphysical remainder in science is the trace of the human world view, not the representation of the fragmenting, anatomizing view of the abstract individual-scientist, but the possibility of the integrity of a being in this world. Philosophy and metaphysics act as remainders of the human in the scientific world view. This remainder becomes the most important one (Žižek writes about the metaphysical Reminder becoming the Principal: “Remainder which, within the Particulars, stands for the Universal, for the Whole “as such,” as opposed to its parts” [17, p. 133]), linking together the diverging trajectories of the agent and object of knowledge.

It is no coincidence that modern philosophy, whose system-forming discipline has always been the theory of knowledge, has raised and highlighted the question of method among the main epistemological issues. And no matter how this method was seen (inductive or deductive), it is important that it, as a motive, a look, a special optics, always contained something human as a certain integrity, as a desire to reunite the tearing relationship of the agent and the object. And this is the “margin of error”, which can eliminate the “blind spot” of scientific objectivity and make the researcher sighted. If we take into account the existence spontaneity of the metaphysical remainder and emphasize its possibilities purposefully and consciously, we can set it up like a tuning-fork for a new vision. Since knowledge as the moment of a person’s practical relation to the world always presupposes the negation of the present, of what is, and the discovery of a new, tuning-fork of the metaphysical remainder does not contradict the tasks of science. On the contrary, it opens up horizons that are objectively invisible and unthinkable. Badiou says: “The specific goal of philosophy is to offer a single conceptual space in which action for naming events takes place, serving as the starting point of truth procedures”. He continues on the philosophy: “It does not establish any truth, but it sets a locus of truth” [18, p. 37].

By linking agent and object in the unity of practice, philosophical metaphysics turns the well-known prejudice about Marx’s philosophy, which incorporated practice into the theory of knowledge, from head to foot. In fact, on the contrary, knowledge was thought of as a necessary side of the process of real activity.

Since the metaphysical remainder is the remainder of a never developing human whole, always just striving to this, there is always a fragility, a lack of guarantee of this integrity. This is clearly seen in the material proposed by A. Badiou, about a combination of four conditions, giving rise each time to a new point of philosophizing and giving a chance for the preservation of thought: a poem, a mathema, a political invention and love. If any of these conditions is lacking, the philosophical remainder loses its own integrity, and the process of “felling” the philosophy to other forms of thought begins. In the best outcome, in our context, it becomes the philosophy of science. In the worst outcome, the scientification of philosophy begins. To avoid such a reduction, the researcher can "hold the

point" of thought by going beyond the limits of his professional, abstract type of activity, which necessarily entails going into another language.

In this language, non-scientific words are used, and not from the classical-philosophical lexicon. Philosophy begins to speak in the language of aesthetics, or metaphysics takes on the features of aesthetic discourse. This happens not because it is impossible to articulate the unity of object and agent in the language of traditional philosophical categories, but because of the specificity of the subject, captured in the discourse. In other words, this unity is veiled by the colossal hierarchy of mediations, the enormous structure of science as a modern social institution, with the distorting displacement of the modern system for social division of scientific work. If we want to see "social relations between people mediated by images," our vision must take into account all these transformations, it must be parallax. M.K. Mamardashvili writes: "The main illusion, of course, is the empty space between our supposedly disembodied look and its visible side. It is necessary to destroy such intuitive thinking in this area, freeing up a field for analyzing what is actually happening in the world, including its reflection" [19, p. 122].

If not to overcome, but at least take into account this illusion, the researcher must constantly see himself in the process of cognitive activity and, being in the position of science or images of the scientific worldview, restore the integrity of the human presence in the world. This integrity is pronounced by philosophy, more precisely, by its aesthetic component, which is most tuned to the comprehension of image-structures. In this sense, aesthetics acquires the status of an independent method that coincides with its subject ("relations..., mediated by images").

In order to keep this human view of the world, it is necessary to go beyond the limits of a narrow scientific vision into practice, which will make it possible to discover other aspects of the subject and develop a different language for speaking about it. Such a language of speaking can be, for example, the language of aesthetics, which often categorizes images that have never been involved in scientific discourse [20, pp. 1192-1193]. For example, scientists needed to write a scientific *picture of the world*, using the terminology of the painter, and the researcher of modern society, Debord, needed the term "spectacle". Organized into categorical systems, such concepts become tools not of abstract thinking, but of contemplation and set the coordinates of the space in which the moment of truth is possible.

V. CONCLUSION

The analysis made it possible to conclude that attempts to demythologize various cultural, social phenomena from the standpoint of rigorous science prove to be untenable. Science, like any other cultural form, as well as a great narrative, can be mythologized on its own grounds (rationality, denotation, objectivism). This, however, does not mean that the very pathos of demythologization (deideologization, desacralization) is incorrect. These are procedures that must be carried out constantly on different grounds and from different positions. These procedures exist only in a form of process. When the temptation arises to recognize some universal way of exposing the mythological essence of a particular phenomenon, the researcher falls into the trap of a new mythological turn. The reflection, necessary for defining one's own research strategy and its limits, is possible only with access to the areas, which are marginal for world's science, including the field of philosophical metaphysics. The approaches used by

the authors of this article may be the methods for the realization of such reflection and self-reflection, which allows to go into marginal areas of research. The principles of oscillation, parallax, parade of theoretical forms already contain the possibility of mutual reflection, clarification of different strategies, choice of non-traditional optics for perceiving the studied phenomenon.

REFERENCES

- [1] Derrida, J. (1998). *Of grammatology* (Corrected ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.145. ISBN 0801858305. OCLC 39348029
- [2] Derrida, J. (1985). Letter to a Japanese Friend. *Derrida and Differance*, ed. Wood & Bernasconi, Warwick: Parousia Press, pp. 1-5.
- [3] Fliyer, A.F. *Cultural Studies after Postmodernism*. Retrieved on 24 April, 2018, from: <http://flatik.ru/a-yafliyer-nauki-o-kulture-posle-postmodernizma/>
- [4] Gizatova, G.K., Ivanova, O.G., Karimov, A.R., Stepanenko, G.N., Tereshchenko, N.A., Shatunova, T.M. (2017) Myth in the structure of national consciousness. *Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences*, 9(7S): 1368-1379.
- [5] Barthes, R. (1972) Mythologies. Publisher Annette Lavers. New York: Hill and Wang.
- [6] Heidegger, M. (1949) Was ist Metaphysik? 5., durch eine Einleitung erseiterte Auflage, mit neu durchgesehenem Nachwort. Frankfurt am Main. (In German)
- [7] Heidegger, M. (1954) Überwindung der Metaphysik. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Pfullingen: Neske, pp. 71-99.
- [8] Lyotard, J-F. (1979) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. English translation by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press.
- [9] Badiou, A. (1989) Manifesto for Philosophy. Retrieved on 31 March, 2011, from: http://www.artinfo.ru/ru/news/main/Alain_Badiou-manifeste_pour_la_philosophie.htm
- [10] Barthes, R. (2002) *S/Z*. Translated by Richard Miller, preface by Richard Howard. Blackwell Publishing Ltd., p. 271. ISBN 0631176071
- [11] Žižek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, p.272.
- [12] Debord, G. (2002) The Society of the Spectacle. *Chapter 1: The Culmination of Separation*. Retrieved on 3 February, 2019, from: <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/guy-debord-the-society-of-the-spectacle#toc3>
- [13] Marx, K. (1976) *Theses on Feuerbach*. Retrieved on 4 February, 2019, from: <https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furg/gned/marxtonf45.pdf>
- [14] Postmodernizm. E`nciklopediya. Minsk: Interpresservis, Knizhny`j Dom, 2001. (in Russian)
- [15] Lyotard, J-F. (1998) Sostoyaniye postmoderna. Moskva, SPb. (in Russian)
- [16] Bobrov, E.A. (1894) On a Concept of Art. Saint-Petersburg: Pechatnya.
- [17] Žižek, S. (2014) The Puppet and the Dwarf. *The Perverse Core of Christianity (Short Circuits)*. MIT Press, p. 197. ISBN 9780262287760
- [18] Badiou, A. (1999) Manifesto for Philosophy. In Madarasz, N. translation. State University of New York Press. ISBN 0791442209
- [19] Mamardashvili, M.K. (2010) Klassicheskij i neklassicheskij idealy` racional`nosti. Saint-Petersburg: Azbuka, Azbuka-Attikus, p. 288. (in Russian)
- [20] Shatunova, T., Tereshchenko, N. (2015) Aesthetics of the Social (Action). *Working papers of the 6th LUMEN Conference "Rethinking social action. Core values"*, 16-19 April 2015, pp.1191-1194.